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The NASA manned spaceflight pro-
gram has t he basic aim of exploring 
as much of the universe as practi-
cal, using man as a sensor, com-
puter, and decision-maker to im-
prove exploration. In existence 
since the establishment of NASA 
in 1958, this program now includes 
as approved developments the Mer-
cury one-man spacecraft, the 
Gemin i two-man rendezvous space-
craft, and t he Apollo lunar-landing 
mission. 
Under study in the various 
NASA centers are more advanced 
missions, such as the orbiting space 
station, a lunar base, and inter-
planetary manned missions. Al-
t hough not yet approved programs, 
these advanced studies undertake to 
provide the basic technology for ex-
tending our efforts when advisable. 
How can these various projects 
provide orderly prog ress in the goal 
of solar-system exploration? This 
is the question we would like to dis-
cuss, first , in terms of general com-
ments on the development process. 
The over-all planning of a total 
manned spaceflight program should 
be based on a logical sequence of 
steps. The planning of each ind i-
vidual project within such a total 
program should be similarly based. 
Individual projects should normally 
be established only to cover the 
greatest reasonable advance in capa-
bilities that seems feasible within 
the state of the art at any given 
time. Future steps within the total 
program should be planned to take 
advantage of foreseen progress in 
the state of the art and individual 
projects should be so planned as to 
allow the inser tion or use of unfore-
seen r eal advances or break-
throughs. Yet the goals of each 
phase of the program should be 
rather firml y established before-
hand and care must be exercised to 
avoid delays resulting from con-
tinual changes brought about by the 
insertion of apparent or less-con-
sequential advances. The proverbial 
wisdom of t he ages would be re-
quired to completely avoid this para-
doxical situation of planning for ad-
vances but yet not letting changes 
introduced by the advances result in 
undue delays. 
The successful demonstration of 
man's capabilities in space and the 
advances made in spacecraft and 
launch-vehicle technology open a 
broad vista of possible manned 
spaceflight programs. Yet the na-
tional economy and technical re-
sources cannot conceivably support 
all the possible programs. For this 
reason, the attack on the space 
frontier must be pointed and deep, 
rather than broad. Each succeed-
ing program must be planned not 
as an end in itself, but as both a 
useful mission and as a stepping-
stone in technology leading to the 
next program. 
Many of us would agree sched-
uling such far-reaching programs 
needs improvement over past prac-
tice. It has been traditional, in this 
country at least, for planners to 
overestimate progress during the 
immediate future and to underesti-
mate progress for the more distant 
future . The graph appearing on 
page 27 illustrates this point. The 
estimate made at T (0 ) will likely be 
optimistic for short times, because 
of a tendency to set tight schedules, 
based on the assumption t hat every 
system will work as planned. Set~ 
ting tight schedules keeps each ele-
ment of the system moving ahead at 
its maximum pace; and, for those 
systems which do not exhibit de-
velopmental troubles, allows the in-
troduction of advances in the state 
of t he a r t. 
Some systems are prone to de-
velopmental troubles. The tight 
schedule is not met and progress in 
the near future is less than esti-
mated. The increased progress in 
the far future results both from the 
advances introduced as just stated 
and from the normally cautious ap-
proach of planning on step-by-step 
progress and not purposely counting 
on breakthroughs occurring. 
To get the best progress, we think 
planners of fu tu re programs and 
projects should: 
1. Plan pointed, specific, and or-
derly programs that provide useful 
short-term knowledge and lead 
logically into the next longer term 
step. 
2. Insure that estimates of near-
future progress are not lowered. 
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3. Be prepared to make less prog-
ress than estimated in the early 
phases of a program. 
4. Be prepared to encounter 
otherwise unforeseen advances 
which will speed progress in later · 
stages of a program. 
5. Plan the approach to new pro-
grams so that, although the goals 
are firm and not subject to contin-
ual change, the plans are flexible 
enough to be modified to accept 
breakthroughs and advances in the 
state of the art. 
The present manned spaceflight 
program-Mercury, Gemini, and 
Apollo-each prosecuted to a suc-
cessful termination, will develop a 
fairly strong technical base for 
planning future projects. 
The initial experience of manned 
spaceflight has been obtained in 
Mercury. This experience is not 
only applicable to flight and ground-
operations crews but is also impor-
tant in all phases of design engi-
neering and management. Since 
Mercury is a simple spacecraft sys-
tem, this experience will be greatly 
broadened in Gemini and then in 
Apollo. 
Gemini will provide the first at-
tempts at maneuvering in space in 
which the magnitude and direction 
of the velocity changes made will be 
computed during the flight in re-
sponse to the situation created dur-
ing the mission. Similarly, the 
capability will be developed to land 
at a predetermined point by guiding 
the spacecraft in re-entry and de-
scent attitudes. Gemini will also al-
low longer flights and more complex 
experiments. 
Apollo will give the first deep-
space navigation experience. In 
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many respects, Apollo will also have 
the first real mission. Its crew will 
be transported to the moon, and ex-
periment, explore, and gather sam-
ples there. In Mercury and Gemini. 
except for incidental experiments, 
the mission objective is to learn 
about spaceflight. The Apollo crew 
is expected to guide the craft down 
to the surface of a hostile world 
only vaguely understood in detail 
and extremely difficult to reach. 
This requirement is challenging our 
technology and is also stimulating 
the growth in this technology 
needed for our future projects. 
When Project Apollo achieves its 
initial goal, our technology will have 
attained greatly increased capabil-
ity in launch vehicles, high-energy 
propulsion systems, deep-throttling 
rocket engines, guidance and navi-
gation equipment of high accuracy 
and reliability, and great increases 
in propulsion system reliability, 
streamlined launch procedures, a 
greatly improved and expanded 
deep-space network, and many other 
such attainments. 
Future projects in t he manned 
spaceflight program must be con-
sidered in view of our present ef-
forts. Developments in the prog-
ress of both spacecraft and launch 
vehicles will represent significant 
increases in capability. As we have 
said, these improvements will be 
obtained only through large invest-
ments in money and manpower, and 
for this reason future projects must 
both complement these efforts and 
represent in themselves significant 
improvements in desirable capabili-
ties. 
Presently, three advanced proj-
ects are receiving serious considera-
tion-the orbital space station, the 
lunar base, and the interplanetary 
spaceship. Both the orbital space 
station and the lunar base are 
achievable within the capabilities 
of the advanced Saturn launch ve-
hicle, and in this sense will profit 
from developments of the present 
program. The lunar base is not 
quite as clearly defined as the or-
bital station (see page 52). A 
better assessment of this project 
will result when more is learned 
about the character of the moon 
from the Ranger and Surveyor proj-
ects as well as from Apollo. 
Research has been in progress on 
multimanned orbiting space stations 
during the last two years both 
within NASA and by contractors. 
The space station will allow scien-
tific studies of meteoroids (density, 
velocity, size, and direction of 
flight ) ; studies of the complete 
spectrum of space radiation; and 
astronomical observation at visible, 
ultraviolet, infrared, and radio fre-
quencies; detailed investigations of 
weather patterns on earth and of 
the solar- and earth-radiated heat 
balance as affected by cloud cover 
and as it affects cloud cover; and 
detailed studies of the earth's geog-
raphy, defining much better the 
relative location of many geo-
graphic features on the earth's 
surface. 
The space station or the lunar 
base will put investigations of ma-
terials, structural systems, electri-
cal power systems, communications, 
etc., in the real space environment, 
and so will eliminate the need for 
simulating or partially simulating 
these environments on the earth's 
surface. They will allow engineers 
to study systems in space over long 
periods of time under more ade-
quately controlled conditions of both 
observation and measurement. For 
instance, a large multimanned or-
biting space station will allow long-
term research into maintenance-free 
communications satellites. 
The large size and weight and ex-
tremely long-duration missions of 
the manned space station, moreover, 
will permit investigation in the real 
space environment of many specific 
systems--environmental control, 
electric power, propulsion, commu-
ni·cation, navigation and guidance, 
etc.-required for manned plane-
tary missions. 
This cumulative technology 
should indeed establish a sound 
basis for manned interplanetary 
flight and all this foresees. 
The first interplanetary space-
ship project will probably be de-
signed for an initial exploration of 
Mars; and the next generation of 
space hardware will be clearly rep-
resented in the exploration of this 
planet. Virtually every aspect of 
the system will benefit from and 
perhaps be dependent on yet-to-be-
developed improvements in technol-
ogy. Some of these might be revo-
lutionary departures from the past. 
such as nuclear propulsion. 
It is obviously premature to at-
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tempt to conceive hardware designs 
of interplanetary spaceships in any 
significant detail. Yet it is impor-
tant from time to time to try to vis-
ualize future mission requirements 
so that today's research and devel-
opment efforts may perhaps be bet-
ter focused . Let us discuss some 
considerations which will shape the 
design of this mission and which 
should influence research and de-
velopment efforts in the interim. 
Mars has an orbital period of 
roughly l.88 terrestrial years. Op-
position presents the natural time 
for missions to be flown, and these 
occur at intervals of slightly over 
two years. Time and distance for 
the next several oppositions are as 
follows: 
DATE DISTANCE (mi. ) 
Feb. 3, 1963 61,700,000 
Mar. 8, 1965 61,700,000 
Apr. 13, 1967 56,200,000 
May 29, 1969 45,300,000 
Aug. 6, 1971 34,600,000 
Oct. 21, 1973 40,600,000 
Dec. 13, 1975 53,100,000 
Eccentricity of the planetary or-
bits (primarily Mars ) causes oppo-
sition distance to vary, and a 2-deg 
difference in the orbital planes of 
earth and Mars results in a varia-
tion of the energy (velocity ) re-
quired to make t he mission at each 
opposition. Low-energy transfers 
require approximately a half year 
each way, depending on the distance 
at opposition. 
Then the nature of the mission-
fly-by, orbital reconnaissance, ren-
dezvous with a Martian moon, or 
planetary landing-naturally affects 
total energy requirement. 
The fly-by mission will demand 
the least energy but will also have 
the least scientific value. It will 
gi\·e the crew an opportunity fo r a 
close-up observation of Mars. This 
mission may be feasible within 
Satu rn launch-vehicle capability, es-
pecia lly if earth rendezvous were to 
be employed. Assuming only minor 
Yelocity adjustments would be made 
during the mission, the proximity of 
the fly-by to Mars would depend on 
the velocity in the vicinity of Mars 
and the amount the spacecraft path 
was to be deflected. For this rea-
"on. the proximity will be totally 
dependent on the manner in which 
he whole mission is planned. The 
sho rter the total miss ion (higher 
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energy) , the closer will be the fly-by 
path. This is a necessary feature 
only of those missions in which it 
is desired that the spacecraft re-
turn to earth without a major pro-
pulsive thrust in the vicinity of 
Mars. 
In addition to providing the crew 
with a close-up optical observation 
of Mars, a fly-by miss ion could take 
advantage of other means of prob-
ing for scientific information. De-
tailed surface-temperature measure-
ments could be made with bolom-
eters. Spectrographic analysis of 
the atmosphere could be obtained 
by observing the entry wakes of 
probes. Similarly, bombs might be 
used to analyze surface constitu-
ents. Other probes might be soft-
landed on the surface for more 
sophisticated investigations. All 
these many measurements, however, 
would have to be made during a 
short period when the crew would 
also be concerned with the most ex-
citing exercises of the spacecraft's 
navigation. Furthermore, these 
measurements are in many ways no 
better than t hose which might be 
obtained with a properly operating, 
rather sophisticated, unmanned 
probe. 
Mars orbital reconnaissance 
would differ from the fly-by mission 
by using rocket power in the vicin-
ity of the planet first to enter into 
and then depart from an orbit about 
it. The use of propulsion in the 
vicinity of Mars releases the mis-
sion from the proximity restraints 
which characterize the fly-by mis-
sion. Significant savings in the 
energy requirements could be 
achieved by using an eccentric orbit 
entered (and left) at perigee, 
rather than by using a circular or-
bit. This eccentric orbit would 
provide sufficient opportunity for 
close-up observation of Mars, as 
well as excursions through its mag-
netic field and radiation belts. In 
general, the same types of measure-
ments would be made as those in 
the fly-by mission, except that there 
would be a much longer time for 
observation and an opportunity .to 
approach much closer to the Martian 
su rface. 
Mars has two very small, appar-
ently natural, satellites-Phobos 
and Deimos, conservatively esti-
mated at 10 and 5 mi. in diam, re-
spectively. Lacking significant 
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takes this form. Judging the future from to has 
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gravity, these satellites can be 
landed on simply through orbital-
rendezvous techniques . The satel-
lites have orbits essentially in the 
plane of the Martian equator, and 
so inclined to the ecliptic by about 
25 deg. Making this plane change 
in approach will require additional 
energy. 
These two moons are in fairly low 
orbits, Phobos 3300 n. mi. above t he 
su rface and Deimos 11,000 n. mi. 
Besides being interesting in them-
selves, they should be ideal sites for 
long-duration research instrumen-
tation set up to observe the planet 
throughout its seasons (assuming 
the near certainty that they have 
reached a fixed relative orientation 
to Mars through gravity-vector sta-
bilization and magnetic damping) . 
The mission designed to land men 
on the surface of Mars will not only 
require the largest and most com-
plex spacecraft system, but will 
also provide the greatest return in 
scientific data. This mission will 
require much more propulsive en-
ergy for velocity changes than those 
previously described, especially in 
any short-duration flight attempted. 
The Mars landing mission may have 
to await t he development of nuclear 
propulsion to be considered practi-
cal. 
A number of alternate mission 
schemes may be considered. The 
use of a separate landing module 
as will be used in Project Apollo is 
certainly an obvious contender. 
This landing module may be 
launched from either a close-in cir-
cular orbit or a highly eccentric or-
bit with a low perigee. The circu-
lar orbit would require the least 
performance from the excursion 
module, but would require more per-
£7 
formance from the mother ship. 
Since the lander can use atmos-
pheric braking for descent, this 
tradeoff would appear to favor the 
elliptical orbit from a performance 
standpoint. Operationally, however, 
the circular orbit would appear to 
be somewhat simpler. 
In the Apollo mission analysis, 
clear-cut performance gains were 
shown for the rendezvous technique. 
Since Mars has an atmosphere, a 
new performance tradeoff study 
would be required for this condi-
tion to determine if the advantage 
would still remain. 
Operationally, however, the di-
rect-landing technique may be hard 
to justify. It would commit an ex-
tremely complicated and heavy 
spaceship to a landing on the far 
side of the planet without the bene-
fit of updated reconnaissance. This 
vehicle would also have to make a 
successful hypervelocity atmos-
pheric maneuver with the very 
awkward-to-carry propulsive capa-
bility necessary for return to earth. 
The employment of earth-orbit 
rendezvous for assembly of the total 
mission capability will most likely 
be required. Reliability might be 
enhanced by use of a fleet of two 
or three vehicles, rather than a 
single spacecraft. The fleet ap-
proach may also be used to improve 
capability through resupply or re-
fueling in transit. Perhaps the 
most significant manner in which 
in-transit rendezvous could be em-
ployed would be a pickup maneuver 
immediately after trans-earth injec-
tion. In this event, the pickup 
craft would trail the landing party 
by several weeks during the out-
bound journey. It would be guided 
along a fly-by trajectory and hence 
would require only modest propul-
sion capabilities. The spacecraft 
would leave the surface of Mars, on 
an orbit about Mars, at the proper 
time to rendezvous with the pickup 
vehicle on the homeward-bound leg. 
While this may be considered a 
high-risk operation, it may be fa-
vored as a scheme that would lie 
within practical chemical-rocket 
capability. 
Many unknown environmental 
factors contribute to uncertainty in 
the design approach. It is hoped 
that more factual information on 
the environment can be obtained 
during the same period in which 
£8 
spacecraft technology is improving. 
Mission and system analysis can 
then be carried out with a minimum 
amount of guesswork when the time 
comes for the final design decisions. 
More facts · about the Martian 
weather need to be known. The 
velocity and direction of surface 
winds and the nature of any sand-
storms are certainly important 
considerations. Apparently there 
are seasonal effects and, un-
doubtedly, there are variations with 
time of day and latitude. It might 
be mentioned that a special statis-
tical study of wind and wave condi-
tions in the Atlantic Ocean had to 
be made as part of the operational 
analysis that went into the landing 
system design for Mercury. Not 
as much will be known about Mar-
tian weather as about Atlantic 
Ocean weather. The result will un-
doubtedly be the use of design mar-
gins as a substitute for knowledge. 
At this time, only conjectures can 
be made about magnetic fields and 
trapped radiation belts about Mars. 
However, a mission envisioning an 
extended period of orbiting the 
planet must include an estimate of 
the radiation dose. There is also 
a need for knowledge of the micro-
meteorite flux in the regions of 
space between Mars and earth. Al-
though Mariner gave indications of 
decreased micrometeorite encoun-
ters as it left the vicinity of earth, 
this can only be considered a favor-
able sign. Mars is much closer to 
the asteroid belt and may also share 
the earth's apparent ability to con-
centrate micrometeorites. 
The surface characteristics of 
Mars and its atmosphere are not as 
well defined as might be wished. It 
does not seem likely that a horizon-
tal landing would be employed on 
the initial attempt. For this rea-
son, improved knowledge will not 
strongly affect the design approach. 
The biological environment, on the 
other hand, will undoubtedly be an 
issue of concern from the stand-
point of extra-vehicular operations. 
From a communication stand-
point, the possible existence of ion-
ized layers that would block part of 
the transmission spectrum may be 
of interest. It would seem unlikely, 
however, that this would include 
part of the spectrum not already 
blocked by the earth's layers. Thus, 
this would only be a consideration 
in choosing a frequency for com-
municating between the landing ve-
hicle and the mother ship. 
More information can undoubt-
edly be obtained with improved ob-
servation of Mars from the earth's 
surface. It is safe to predict, how-
ever, that only modest changes in 
the total knowledge of the planet 
can be obtained in this manner dur-
ing the next decade. The necessary 
knowledge -of the environment of 
the mission must come from other 
sources. Primarily, improvements 
can be obtained by use of manned 
fly-by and Mars-orbital missions 
and possibly from unmanned probes 
sent to the vicinity and the surface 
of Mars. Because Mars has an at-
mosphere, the landing of probes, 
particularly those launched from a 
manned Mars-orbital spacecraft, 
should not be too difficult. The sim-
plicity of atmospheric deceleration 
and aerodynamic stability, as op-
posed to rocket deceleration and 
black-box stability, will go far to 
overcome the difficulties associated 
with the remoteness of the planet. 
Such probes would not only be of 
immediate value to science, but 
would materially assist the manned 
mission. 
Moreover, the knowledge of Mars 
might be greatly enhanced by ob-
servations from an earth-orbit 
space station or a lunar base. The 
almost continuous observation of 
Mars will be very valuable in as-
sessing the seasonal and daily varia-
tions in the surface environment 
and will, perhaps, provide a means 
for interpretation and evaluation 
not otherwise available. 
Special attention has been given 
here to the Mars-exploration mis-
s ion as the most advanced mission 
on which conjecture is timely. 
Again, we direct the reader's at-
tention to the fact that, in order to 
insure the proper planning of the 
utilization of the nation's resources 
that can be committed to the space 
program, the frontier for explora-
tion must be both pointed and deep. 
A broad attack on this frontier 
could absorb the total resources of 
the nation. It is important that 
the program goals selected be those 
giving a very high return per unit 
effort in the short range while at 
the same time opening opportuni-
ties for similarly high gains during 
the next program generation. •• 
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